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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 



















HEr INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL ) 
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT VI, LLC, ) 
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC, ) 
DENNIS A. MERONEY, and FREDERICK ) 







DONG FENG FANG, CHUN LEI FU, 
MAO LIN WEI, and HONG MEl ZHOU, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HEI INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL 
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT VI, LLC, 
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC, 
DENNIS A. MERONEY, FREDERICK W. 
CERRONE, FRIEDMAN, DEVER, & 
MERLIN, LLC, and SHELDON E. 
FRIEDMAN, 
Defendants. 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil Action File No. 2015-CV-261534 
ORDER ON HEG DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
This matter is before the Court on HEG Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' Tort Claims and Punitive Damage Claim. A judgment based on the 
pleadings should be granted "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay 
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c). A 
standard similar to summary judgment may be applied to judgment based on the pleadings. ld. 
"For the purposes of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material 
1 
allegations of the opposing party's pleadings are to be taken as true, and all allegations of the 
moving party which have been denied are taken as false." Blier v. Greene, 263 Ga. App. 35, 35 
(2003). A defendant's motion should be granted if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of provable facts. Consolidated Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Genoa Canst. Servs., 
Inc., 279 Ga. App. 894, 896 (2006). "(A) judgment on the pleadings cannot be granted unless 
the pleadings affirmatively show that no claim in fact exists." Gray v. Mckenna, 202 Ga. App. 
685,685 (1992) (citing Bacon v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 436 (1991». Having 
considered the briefing of all parties on the Motion and the relevant case and statutory law on the 
matter, the Court finds as follows: 
Defendants Hotel Equities Group, LLC, HEI Investments, LLC, Hotel Equities 
Development III, LLC, Frederick W. Cerrone, and Dennis A. Meroney (collectively "HEG 
Defendants") sought investors for a hotel development in Dalton, Georgia. Plaintiffs Fang, Fu, 
Wei, and Zhou invested approximately $1.7 million in HEI, the entity that was to construct the 
hotel, in exchange for Preferred Units of Membership Interest ("Units") in HE!. The money was 
wired to Friedman, Dever & Merlin, LLC ("FDM") and Sheldon E. Friedman, the attorneys 
representing the HEG Defendants, and placed in a trust account for safekeeping. This escrow 
account was created and entrusted in accordance with the Private Placement Memorandum 
("PPM") and the Subscription Agreements. Plaintiffs' money was to be held in escrow, only to 
be released to HEI when eleven Units in HEI were sold. If the remaining Units were not sold, 
Plaintiffs could request a return of their investments. The remaining Units were not sold by the 
deadline and Plaintiffs withdrew their subscriptions, demanding refunds. However, Plaintiffs did 
not receive repayment from Defendants. Instead, the money was released to Black Diamond, a 
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non-party prospective lender from New Jersey, without informing Plaintiffs or obtaining consent 
from them about the action. 
Plaintiffs filed suit against HEG Defendants, FDM, and Friedman, alleging: (1) 
conversion and trover, (2) money had and received, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) promissory 
estoppel, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of fiduciary duty, (7) breach of trust, (8) breach of 
constructive trust, (9) fraud, (10) negligent misrepresentation, (I}) recovery of money illegally 
paid, (12) liability of agent for excess of authority, (13) joint liability for and malicious 
procurement of conversion, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud, (14) ratification 
of conversion, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, I (18) negligence, (19) 
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, and (20) punitive, deterrence, and exemplary damages. 
HEG Defendants filed a third party complaint against its insurer, Hanover Insurance Company 
("Hanover") seeking indemnity and defense. However, the Court granted Hanover's motion for 
summary judgment because Exclusion N2 in the insurance contract expressly excluded coverage 
of any claim "directly or indirectly based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or 
alleged liability under a written or oral contract or agreement." After consideration of the facts 
and circumstances alleged, the Court determined that all twenty counts relied on the same set of 
facts, and that none of Plaintiffs' claims would exist but for Plaintiffs' relationship with HEG 
Defendants as established by the Subscription Agreements and the PPM. The Court rejected 
HEG Defendants' argument that several claims, like unjust enrichment and money had and 
I Counts 15, 16, and 17 were dismissed in this Court's Order on Motions to Dismiss dated March 7, 2016. 
2 Exclusion N excludes from coverage: 
" 'Loss' on account of any 'Claim' made against any 'Insured' directly or indirectly based upon, 
arising out of, or attributable to any actual or alleged liability under a written or oral contract or 
agreement. However, this exclusion does not apply to your liability that would have attached in 
the absence of such contract or agreement." 
Exclusion IY.N of the D&O Coverage Part ("Exclusion N"). 
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received, could only be brought in the absence of a contract and thus, the claims were not subject 
to Exclusion N. The Court focused on the "genesis of the claims" and whether the claims "were 
in any way connected with the breach of contract." See City of College Park v. GIRMA, 313 Ga. 
App. 239,245 (2011) ("the underlying facts and circumstances of the claims asserted, rather than 
the theory of the claims, determine whether the exclusion applies"). The Court noted that 
Plaintiffs had not alleged HEG Defendants had a duty to them independent of the Subscription 
Agreements. HEG Defendants put much emphasis on this language in the Order. More 
precisely stated, however, Plaintiffs did not allege a claim against HEG Defendants that did not 
factually relate directly or indirectly to the Subscription Agreements. Given the Court's 
conclusion that all the claims arose directly or indirectly from a contract or agreement, HEG 
Defendants now seek dismissal of all claims sounding in tort and for punitive damagea' 
The Court finds that it ruling in its Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
regarding the applicability of Exclusion N is not determinative whether the duties allegedly 
breached by HEG Defendants arose from a contract or independent of it. "It is well settled that 
mere failure to perform a contract does not constitute a tort. A plaintiff in a breach of contract 
case has a tort claim only where, in addition to breaching the contract, the defendant also 
breaches an independent duty imposed by law." ServiceMaster Co., LP v. Martin, 252 Ga. App. 
751,754 (2001). A single act could create both contract and tort causes of action, dependent on 
whether the purportedly breached duty arose from a contract or independent of it. Foster 
Wheeler Corp v. Georgia Power Co., 140 Ga. App. 261, 265-66 (1976). For an action to be a 
tort, not a contract breach, the duty imposed could be either through a "valid statutory enactment 
of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the 
3 While HEG Defendants are arguing that the tort claims must fail, they are simultaneously appealing the Court's 
Order on Cross-Summary Judgment Motions arguing that tort claims exist independent of a contract, and thus 
Hanover is required to provide insurance coverage. They have also denied the existence of a final, binding contract. 
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reported decisions of (our) appellate courts." Peterson v. First Clayton Bank & Trust Co., 214 
Ga. App. 94, 99 (1994). The question of duty is for the Court to determine, not the trier of fact. 
Adler's Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 72 (1989). 
The exclusion for claims covered under the insurance contract is not co-extensive to 
Georgia's common law excluding tort claims when the duty breached is dependent on a contract. 
The insurance exclusion barred coverage of all claims, regardless of whether they would be 
barred otherwise, of all claims arising directly or indirectly from the existence of a contract, 
based on the facts and circumstances. Whether a duty arises contractually or independent of a 
contract is a separate inquiry. A claim may be indirectly related to the existence of a contract 
and thus excluded from coverage under the insurance policy, and yet the duty may arise 
independent of the express terms of the contract at issue. 
As such, REG Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' Tort 
Claims and Punitive Damage Claim is DENIED. REG Defendants request the Court award 
attorneys' fees incurred from responding to this motion under O.CG.A. § 9-15-14. That request 
is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED, this 1111- day of August, 2016. 
~L~~K~ 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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For Defendants Friedman, Dever & Merlin, 
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For Defendants Hotel Equities Group, LLC, 
HEI Investments, LLC, Hotel Equities 
Development Ill, LLC, Frederick W Cerrone, 
and Dennis A. Meroney (Third Party Plaintiffs) 
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